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CHAPTER I.
Introductory.
As ageneral and elementary principle of law every
person is liable citily fo& his own acts and for them
alone. The two main exceptions to this rule are found
in the relations of Principal and Agent and of Master
and Servant. I shall attempt to treat here only of the
civil liability of the master to third persons arising
from the wrongful acts of the servant, as expounded by
the courts of the state of New York. The law in the
other states does not materially differ from that of
New York and time will not permit a discussion of their
cases.
The general doctrine of the masters liability is
that the master is liable to answer in a civil suit for
the tortious or wrongful acts of his servant, if those
acts are done in the course of his employment in his
master's service. (1) There are two maxims which bear
(1) Smith's Master and Servant star page 322.
upon this rule; Respondeat Superior and Qui facit per
alium, facit per se. These maxims are almost identical
in principle although the first seems to be more often
used with reference to actions ex delicto and the latter
to actions ex contractu.
Servants are as a rule persons of little or no
financial responsibility, and recourse to thewfor a
just recompense for injuries received or losses entailed
by. their negligence or other wrongful acts is of little
practicable benefit, and it is no more than fair and
equitable that the person for ..hom they are acting and
who profits by their deeds should be held liable for
any damage suffered by others.
In modern times and under the present degree of
civilization it is impossible fo' business enterprises
to be carried on entirely by one man and he must employ
others to perform the duties incident to the various
commercial enterprises. The law recognizes this right
to delegate ones duties and it also recognizes the right
of the public to be protected from, and adequately com-
pensated for wrongs suffered through the misconduct of th
8the person employed and justly places the liability on
the one who having had an opportunity of examination as
to the habits and character of his servant employs him
in his business and for his benefit.
CHAPTER II,
The Relation of Master and Servant Must Exist.
In order to fix the liability of one person for
damages resulting from the act of another, not an agent,
the relation of master- and servant must be shown to
exist between the parties. (1) That is that at the
time when the wrong was committed the person committing
it must have been engaged in doing an act for the
person sought to be charged with the liability, and
with his assent.
Whether or not the relation exists is a question
for the jury to determine from the facts of each
individual case. Several tests are given by the
courts. Thus in the case of Michael vs Stanton the
test is suggested as to who had the power to discharge
the servant, that person alone being considered the m
master. In that case one H. was drawing stavebolts
belonging to the defendant from Jamesville into the
(1) Stevens v Armstrong, 6 N. Yo 435 (1852)
Pack v The Mayor, 8 N. Y. 222 (1855)
Svenson v Atlantic Mail Co., 57 N. Y. 108
(1874) Mc Cafferty v S. D. & P. Ml. R. R.
Co., 61 N. Y. 178 (1874) Edwards v Jones
67 How Pr. 177 (1884); Kelly v Doody, 116
N. Y. 575 (1889); Kimball v Cushman 1o3
City of Syracuse. In crossing a bridge his wagon
accidently collided with and injured that of the plain-
tiff who brings this action. It appeared that the
defendant Stanton and a neighbor Gilbert occasionally
changed work with their teams. Gilbert sent H. to
draw the bolts for the defendant and told him where to
load. He H. had worked for defendant before in changing
work and had been at Gilberts when Stanton wap at work
there. Mullin P. J. said; To authorize the justice
to render a judgment against defendant he must have
found that H. was in defendants employ. Such is not
the legitimate conclusion from the evidence. It seems
to me clear that H. was in Gilberts employ and the
latter not Stanton was liable for his negligence. The
defendant did not employ H. and had not the power to
discharge him. This is the only test to determine
which is the master and as such liable to the person
injured. (1)
Mass. 194 (18d9); Pickens v Diercher, 21 0.
St. 212 (1869)
(1) Michael v Stanton, 3Hun. 462 (187).
This test appears to me to be the true one. It
Is the person who employs and has the right to dLscha.ge
the wrong doer who is liable for the wrongs. Such a
one has the opportunity to select and choose his agent
and may determine the relation at wills He can examine
into his habits and character and when he takes him
into his employment he assumes as master the responsi-
bility for his acts.
There are various connections which involve the
relation of Master and servant and the above test does
not apply to all of them. Thus in Callahan v Sharp (1)
the negligence of the driver of a hired livery carriage
was held to be so imputed to the person riding in the
vehicle as to make her guilty of contributory negligence.
But in fixing the liability of the master for damages
caused by the act of the servant the owner of the
carriage is held to be the master of the driver. (2)
(1) Callahan v Sharp, 27 Hun. 8b af'd. 95 N.Y.372
(2) Norris v Kohler, 41 N. Y. 42 (1809).
Kilroy v D.& H. Canal Co. 121 N.Y. 42 (1890.
So where an undertaker who was,superintend a funeral,
furmhah carriages et cetera, sent a carriage and team
of which the driver was the owner, to carry the the
the plaintiff to and from the cemetary, it was held
that the relation of master and servantdid not exist
between the undertaker and the driver and the under taker
was not liable for the drivers negligence. (1) Where
a party contracts to keep certain horses for the winter
and to board a man to take care of them the latter is
deemed the servant of the owner of the carriage. (2) So
even where a passive assent to the drivers action was
given, the passenger was not held liable for the damage
resulting but the driver was regarded as the servant
of the owner of the conveyance.(3)
(1) Boniface v Relyea, 66 Barb. 457 (1868).
(2) Stone v Western Transportation Co., 58 N. Y.
240 (1868).
(3) RichardsoA v Van Ness 53 Hun 267 (1889).
The Relation May be Raised by Implication.
The relation of master and servant need not be
expressly and knowingly entered into but from the various
circumstances of the case the status will be inferred.
Thus the fact that the defendants name was on the
beer delivery wagon, the negligence of the driver of
which caused the collision, was held prima facie
evidence that the defendant owned the wagon and employed
the driver when the accident occured. (1)
Where the plaintiffs raspberry patch was destroyed
by fire started by a burning brand thrown from defend-
ants engine, the fact that the person who threw the
brand was on the engine and apparently engaged at work
there with his coat off was held sufficent in the absence
of evidence to the contrary to fairly raise a presumption
that he was in the employ of the defendant and rightfully
engaged at work uponthe engine. Tre judge in his
(1) Seaman v Koeler, 122 N. Y. 646 (18904;
Mc Gowen v Kuntz, 4 Alb. L. J. 92 (1871);
Svenson v Atlantic Mail Co., 57 N/ Y. 108(1874)
Norris v Kohler, 41 N. Y. 42 (1869).
opinion remarks that the plaintiff could only show the
appearances: the defendant knows whether the person
was in his employ or not and must show the contrary. (1)
In the case of Durst v Burton the defendantsn
represented a voluntary association of farmers who
owned a cheese factory. This they leased to one C.
who contracted to manufacture cheese for them at a spec-
ified price per pound, they to furnish the milk and to
have the cheese which they sold. Some of the cheese
sold was poor in the center and surrounded with good.
The court held that as to the public they assumed the
character of principals and adopted the responsibility
of the manufacture and were liable for the frauds of C.
or his subordinates in the manufacture of the cheese.(2)
A person who directs an officer of the law as to
the manner of his executing his duty is regarded as the
master of the officer and liable for the negligence of
(1) Mc Coun v N.Y.C.&.RoR.Co., 60 Barb. 638(1873)
(2) Durst v Burton, 47 N/ Y, 167 (1872); Olive
v Whitney Mvarble Coo, 103 N. Y, 292 (1886).
the officer in following his instructions. (1) The
keeper of a boarding house is liable as master for the
negligence of his servants resulting in the theft of the
goods of a boarder. (2)
Liability for Acts of Servants Servant.
Where the servant in the course of his masters
busines3 employs another to labor for him or to assist
him in his work the master is liable for any damage re-
sulting from such persons negligence or other misconduct.
(3) A leading case on this point is Althorf v Wolfe (4)
where the defendant a resident of New York City on
leaving his house in the morning directed his coachman
to clear the snow off the roof of the house. The
coachman meeting one Cashan a friend of his asked him
to help in the work and they went togather on to the roof
and shoveled the snow off on to the sidewalk, A mass
(1) Jenner v Joliffe 9 John. 381 (1812)
(2) Smith v Read 6 Daly 33 (1875)
(3) Wood on Master and Servant Sec. 308.
44) Althorf v Wolfe 22 N. Y. 335 (1860).
of the falling snow and ice from the gutters st.u-ck the
plaintiffs intestate who happened to be passing at the
time and caused his death. Cashan testified that he
was employed by no one but merely volunteered to help
his friend. There was some evidence tending to show
that it was he who threw over the ice. Wright J. in
his opinion says "I am of the opinion that, under the
conceeded facts of the case, it was not error to refuse
to charge as requested, and that it was immateriel, as
affecting the defendants liability, whether Fagan (the
coachman) or Cashan actually threw that parcell of the
snow and ice being removed from the roof which occasioned
the fatal injury. In either view it was substantially
the act of Fagan, who had been charged by the defendant
with the duty of cleaning the roof. The defendant had
given him general directions to throw the snow from the
roof of his house, enjoining no caution and suggesting
no mode 6f doing it to prevent injury; nor plading the
servant under any restriction against procuring aid in
the work. I see not therefore why he was not entitled
to procure aid and invested with the power of exercising
his own judgment as to the mode of doing the work. He
selected Cashan to assist him. Provided with the
defendants tools they engage together in the work and in
ite progress one of them throws the deadly missle. Is
this not substantially the act of Fagan? Fagan was
present aiding, directing and controlling Cashan, as much
as he directed or controlled the shovel in his own hands.
Nobody will doubt that if he had thrown it with his
own hands, the defendant would have been responsible.
It can scarcely be less a negligent act of Fagan that
it was thrown by a person whom he had requested to assist
him in the employment in which they were mutually
engaged and who had been admitted upon the roof of the
defendants house without objection.
Where a servant hired by the month to work defend-
ants farm was directed by him to sumier fallow a certain
field lying adjacent to plaintiff's wood lot and several
piles of brush were collected on the field it was held
that when during an extremely dry season the servant
dire cted his son to burn the brush and this was done
in such a negligent manrne-' that Ilaint-lff's i;ood lot
was injured , the master was liable for the danage
occasionedas the act was considered as the act of the
servant. (1)
So a person employed as the driver of a beer delivery
wagon to help him unload a truck of empty barrels was
held to be the servant of the master who became liable
for his negligence. (2)
The Liability of Public Officers.
Public officers as such are not liable for the
wrongful acts of those under them. Thus the Supervisors
of Albany County were held not liable to a convict for
injuries occasioned to him while in their employ in
prison through the negligence of employees. (3)
A contractor who employed the convicts in manu-
(1) Simons v Monier, 29 Barb. 419 (1859).
(2) Gleason v Amsdell, 9 Daly 393 (1880).
(6) Alamango v Supervisors, 23 Hun. 5bl (1881).
facturing is not liable to third persons for injuries
received through the negligence of the convicts2 (1)
A special receiver or assignee of the property of
a railroad corporation appointed in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, involuntary on its part is not an agent or servant
of the corporation and it is not liable for damages
occasioned by his negligence. (2)
So also a receiver or assignee of an insolvent
corporation is not liable personally for the acts of
its servants. (3) He is only liable as receiver and
execution must be against funds which he holds as
receiver. $4)
The Board of Education of the City of New York and
the several boards of ward trustees are official bodies
and the members of such are not individually liable for
(1) Cunningham v Bay State's Shoe and Leather Co.,
96 N. Y. 481 (1383).
(2) Metz v The R. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 61 (1874).
(3) Cardot v Barnes, 63 N. Y. 281 (1875).
(4) Camp v Barney, 4 Hun. 673 (1376 .
20
the negligence of their employees. (I) Andrews J. says
of the several boards; "They were acting as public
officers and in respect to the acts of persons necessar-
ily employed by them, the doctrine of Respondeat superior
has no application."
Jicensed Persons.
Where the State or a community issues licenses to
certain people Lo do certain acts and compels people
to employ only such licensed persons, the relation of m
master and servant does not arise between the parties
and no liability is incurred. (2)
(1) Donavon v Board of Education 85 N.Y. 117 (1881)
Donavon v Mc Alpin 85 N.Y. (1881).
(2) Mc Mullin v Hoyt, 2 Daly 271 (1867).
Contractor- and Contracteeo
So where one contracts with another to take entire
charge of an undertaking and to furnish materiels and
workmen, the relation of contractor and contractee is
entered into and not that of master and servant. (1)
"The rule is that a person who undertakes the erection
of a building or other work for kis own benefit, is not
responsible for injuries to third persons occasioned
by the negligence of a person or his servant, who is
whole
actually engaged in executin,- the Awork under an indepen-
dent employment or a general contract for that purpose. (2
In McCafferty v The S. D.& P. i. R. R. Co. (3) the defen-
dant contracted with one Decker to build its whole toad.
Decker subcontracted a portion of the work and while
the servant of the subcontractor was blasting, a blast
(1) Barrett v Singer Co. I Sweeny 545 (1839);
Iaiatin v Farnsworth 41 How. Pr. 59 (1870);
But le&r v Townsend 126 N.Y. 105 (1871); King
v N.Y.C.& H.R.Co. 66 N.Y. 181 (1876).
(2) Pack v Mayor 8 N.Y.-222(1853); Hexamer vWebb,
101 N.Y. 337 (1886).
( M) i~c Caffelt.i v S.r.& P.ivl.R.R. ol N.Y. 178 (1874)
went off negligently and injured the plaintiffs grocery
stor&.a The court held that the men were emlpoyed by
the subcontractor and the defendant had no control over
them and neither hired nor paid them nor could direct
nor discharge them, and hence the rule respondeat super-
ior applies and the principal for whom the men were
working and by whom they were employed, ie the subcon-
tractor and not the defendant was liable for the damage
done to the plaintiff. Where several persons had
cut and placed logs on the ice to be floated down the
stream in the spring and had contracted with a certain
firm to float the logs to the booms of their respective
owners , when through the negligence of the contractors
servants a jam was formed against the plaintiffs bridge
and carried it away it was held that the owners were
not liable for the destruction of the bridge. (1)
Lessor and Lessee.
The Leisor is not responsible foi- the acts of his
lessee. Where one railroad leases its road to another
and withdraws entirely from the operation of the road it
is not liable for the wrongful acts of the employees
of the lessee. (1) So in the case of Blackwell v
Wiswall (2) the defendant had a license to run a ferry
between Troy and West Troy which he leased to another
and a boat rowed either by the lessee or his servant
was negligently swamped and the plaintiffs intestate
was drowned. The court in its opinion said "The only
principal upon which one man can be made liable f r
the wrongful acts of another is that such a relation
exists between them that the former whether he be called
principal or master is bound to control the conduct of
the latter whether he be agent or servant. The maxim
of the law is respondeat superior. It is only applica-
bla in cases where the party sought to be charged stands
in the relation of superior to the person whose wrongful
act is the ground of complaint. In this case the rela-
tion does not exist.
(1) Fisher v Elevated R.R. 34 Hun. 4'3 (1886).
(2) Blackwell v Wiswall 24 Barb. 355 (1855); Norton
v Wiswall 26 Barb. 618 (1858).
While a person may be in the genera; employment of
one person he may be specially employed to do certain
acts by another and the latter not the former is liable
for wrongful acts done while so employed. (1)
(1) Wyllie v Palmel' 137 N.Y. 248 (1893);
Olive v Whitney Marble Co. 103 N.Y. 212 (1886);
Robbins v Mount 36 How P. 24 (180-7).
CHAPTER III.
For What Acts the Master is Liable.
Having endeavored to discover when the relationiof
Master and Servant exists we now proceed to ascertain
for what acts of his servant the master is held liable
by the New YOrk Courts. The act must be one for the
commission of which the master would be liable if it
was his ownact and the master is liable for no act of
his servant for which an action againstthe servant
would not lie. The master is liable for all acts
done under his express odrers or directions. (1)
But his liability does not by any means end here. He
is liable as well for acts done under his implied direc-
tion; for all acts of the servant done in the execution
of his masters business and within the scope of his
employment. (2)
(I) Rounds v D.L.& W.R.R. 64 N.Y. 129 (187-);
Althorf v Wolfe 22 N.Y. 355; Mali v Lord 39
N.Y. 381 (1868).
(2) Wood on Master and Servant page 525; Rounds v
D.L.& W.R.R. supra; Quinn v Power 87 N.Y. 535
Thus in Higgins v The Watervliet Turnpike Company (1)
the rule was declared to be that the master was responp
sible civiliter for the wrongful act of the servant
causing injury to a third person whether the act was
one of negligence or of positive misfeasance, provided t
the servant was at the time acting for the master and
within the scope of the business entrusted to him. And
this is true even though the servant departed from the
private and express instructions of the master provided
he was engaged at the time in doing his masters business
and was acting within the general scope of his employ-
ment. (2). Thus in the case of Ochsenbein v Shapley
the intending purchaser of a boiler requested the boiler
manufacturers to test the boiler and expressed a wish
that it be tested to one hundred and eighty pounds. The
The boiler maker however replied that one hundred and
fifty pounds was enough as its ordinary use would not
(I) Higgens v Watervliet Turnpike Co. 46 N.Y. 23
(1871); Gerlach v Edelmeyer 88 N.Y. 6,45 (1882)
(2) Rounds v D.L.& W. R.R. 6 4 N.Y. 12 9 (18,6) Peck v
N.Y.C.R.R.Co. 70 N.Y. 587 (1877); Shae v 6th Ave
R.R.Co. 62 N.Y, 180 (1875); Day v Brooklyn R.R.
76 NoY. 5935
require over one hundred and twenty-five pounds pressure
and directed his master mechanic Carter, who was present,
to test it. Carter and the proposed purchaser started
for the place where the boiler was, a public street,
and on the way the latter again expressed a wish for
a test to one hundred and eighty pounds, and Carter
answered "I will test it up to two hundred anyhow; I had
as lief test it to four hundred; you can't burst it."
The fires were lighted and the experiment began with the
sefety valve loaded to a pressure of one hundred and
ninety-eight pounds. That point was reached and the
escaping steam indicated at least that pressure. By
this time the customer had gone, but Carter with a reck-
less confidence in the strength of the boiler sent two
men to the shop for additional weights and befoce their
return, took hold of the lever, first with one hand then
wiuh both, holding it down. On the instant the boiler
exploded and the plaintiff was injured. He brought
suit against the boiler" makers. The court in an able
opinion by Finch J. but with a dissent of three held that
although the act of Carter was reckless and foolhardy
and although in making the test he went beyond the
expressed wishes of his employers nevertheless as he
,q as acting in their business they were liable for his
act.(1)
W'ilful Acts of the Servant.
But when the act of the servant is wilful and mal-
icious it is regarded as evidence that the servant was
not acting for the master but was acting without the
scope of his employment. The personal intent of the
servant, forgetting his master's welfare seems to tend
to make him his own master. But where thw act is
within the general scope of the servants employment while
engaged in his masters business and done with a view to
the furtherance of that business and the masters inter-
esta, the latter is responsible whether the act be done
negligently, wantonly or even wilfully. (2)
(1) Ochsenbein v Shapley, 8D N. Y. 214 (1881).
(2) Mott v Consumers Ice Co., 7.3 N.Y. 546 (1878);
Buffalo Co. v Standard Oil Co., 100 N.Y. dj9,
af'g 42 Hun. 153.
In some of the earlier cases the courts seemed inclined
to hold that the fact that the act was the wilful act
of the servant relieved the master fom all responsibil-
ity (1) but the later cases seem only to regard such
intent as evidence as to whether the se,,vant was acting
for himself or in the business of his master. Thus
in an early case it seems that the "Wave"and the "Samson"
were rival steamboats employed in the business of
carrying passengers from New York to Staten Island.
there was much ill-feeling between th e captains of the
two boats and as the "Wave" left her pier at New York
one day, heavily laden with passengers, the "Samson"
soon followed and overtaking the former ran directly
into her. Frommthe evidence there was no doubt but
(1) Vanderbilt v Richmond Co., 2 N.Y.;79 Frasev
v Freeman, 4o ';.Y. 56; Isaacs v Third Ave.
R. R. Co., 47 N.Y. 122; Hamilton v N. Y. C.
R. R. Co., 51 N.Y. 100.
that the act of the "Samson's" captain was wilful and
malicious, and the court held that Lhe boat owners were
not liable for the damage caused.(l) But recently it
has been held that where the driver wilfully ran his
wagon into the carriage of the plaintiff, that the master
was not relieved f.,om his liability. (2) Whether or
not the act of the servant is wilful is a question for
the jury and must be submitted to them. (6)
(1) Vanderbilt v Richmond Co., supra,
(2) Mott v Consumers Ice Co., 73 N.Y. 540.
(3) Mott v Cons-meers Ice Co., supra; Clark v
Koehler,v 46 Hun. 566; Hamel v Brooklyn Ferry
Co., 125 N.Y. 707.
CHAPTER IV*
Scope of Employment.
The terms "scope of employment" and "Course of
Employment" are used interchangably by the courts althoA
there is some difference in their meaning; The former
term refers especially to the question whether Lhe act,
in its nature, was within the limits marked out by the
contract or instructions under -which the servant or
agent was acting, while "Course of Employment " directs
attention, was the servant at the time , even if we
leave ott of view the particular act in question, engaged
in the pel-formance of service on behalf of his principal
or employer (1) What acts ae and what are not within
the scope or course of a servants employment is a
question of fact which must be determined from the facts
of each case as it arises* Every employment, every line
of work differs as to what duties it lays on those fol-
(1) Abbott's New York Digest, 1802 page 260.
lowing ,t and perhaps the best way to study the subject
will be to take a numbe:z of leading illustrative cases
and see what the courts have held to be within the
scope of employment and what without.
In many cases it is clearly evident that .he acts
are done within the course of the servants employment
as where the driver of an ice wagon r°an into a private
carriage and damaged it, it is plainly seen that the
servant was pursuking, when the accident occured, the
line of duty for %rhich he washired. But in other case
that the acts are within the scope of the servants duty
is more difficult to discover. Thus where a boy
fourteen years old was walking in the street with a
can of water a driver of the defendants horse car
called to him to give him a drink. The horses being
at a walk the plaintiff stepped on the front platform
and gave to the driver the can. He having quenched his
thirst therefrom returned it to the plaintiff talling
him to hurry off quick. The boy asked the driver to
stop the car but he paid no attention to him and as the
plaintiff was stepping off, whipped the horses into a
trot: The boy fell and was run ovei- and injured. The
court held that it was within the scope of the drivers
employment to eat and drink and that the defendant rail
road was liable for the injury occasioned. (1)
In cavanagh v Dinsmore (2) the plaintiff's intestate
was killed while crossing the street by a team and truck
of the defendantthe Adams Express Company, through the
negligence of the driver. The driver after delivering
goods at the defendants office was directed to go to
the stables of the company and put out his team. On
the way he met another driver and as a personal favor
to him went to a street about a mile distant and got a
trunk and valise belonging to the second driver and
took them to a boarding house on Fulton Street. On the
way the accident happened. As the corppany knew nothing
of the doings of the driver and in no way authorized
(1) Day v Brooklyn R. R., 12 Hun. 4ob af'd in 7b
N. Y. (1877).
(2) Cavanagh v D-nsmore 12 Hun. 405 (1878).
the use of their hoises and trck for the purpose, the
act was held not to be within the scope of the driver's
employment.
It has been held that the master is liable if the
act of the servant was the proximate cause of the injury.
Thus where a young boy about fifteen years old caught on
the caboose of a moving freight train, a trainman to
dislodge him threw a cup of water in his face which
caused him to jump or fall off so that he was injured; th
the court said that if the effect of the act was under
the circumstances to deprive the plaintiff of the oppor-
tunity of exercising care in alighting from the car and
thus to cause the injury, then his failure to use the
requisite care to protect himself against injury could
not be deemed contributory negligence as a matter of
law and the railroad company was liable for the injury.(l
In another case a boy having jumped on the car to
ride the brakeman orderud hici- off to which the boy replid
(1) Clark v N.Y.& L.E. & W.R.E. 40 Hun. dob (1836).
" Wait until you get to Weehawken". The brakeman
refused and began to throw pieces of coal at :im where-
upon the bot retreated 1o the next ca: , the brakeman
pursuing. Just as the boy was getting .-eady to jump
off the brakeman rolled a large lump of coal on top of
the car which struck the boy on the head and caused him
to fall beneath the wheels so that he lost a foot and
part of the leg. The brakeman was hea to have been
acting withrin his authority and in the masters business
so as to make the latter liable. (1)
It is well established that the employees of a
common carrier are acting wit'-iin their employment in
putting off fi-om the cars or boat or othe,: conveyance,
disordeily persons and those who refuse to pay theii, far.
Nevertheless the employees must use care in putting off
such persons and for any damage done through their neg-
ligence or thoughtlessness the master is liable. So
(1) Lang v N.Y.L.E.& W.R.R. 12) N.Y. 6bJ (l80o).
while one boarding a train may be a trespasser and the
employees would be justified in using force to prevent
his getting on they have no right to forcibly eject him
from the train while it is in motion. (1)
A boy who jumped on the platform of a moving train a
and while it was going at the rate of ten miles an hour
was kicked off by the condactor or brakeman and injured
by the fall, was allowed to recover of the company.(2)
In Schultz v the Rail Road Company (3) the plaintiff
boarded the rear platform of the defendants car to ride
home and claimed that the conductor without asking his
fare pushed him off in front of another car by which
he was knocked down and run over. The court held that
the defendant was responsible for the alleged act of the
conductor in pushing or throwing the plaintiff from the
car although the act was wilful, reckless and malicious.
(I) Iarlinger v N.Y.C.& H.R.R. 15 WK Dig 652 af'd
in 92 N.Y. 6-1 (1$82).
(2) Hoffman v N.Y.C.& H.R.R. 87 N.Y. 25 (1881).
(5) Schultz v $rd Ave R.R.Co. 89 N.Y.242 (1882).
Where the conductor and driver ejected a sober man
claiming that he was drunk, they were held to be acting
within their employment. (1) In lawfully removing a
person from a train the master is liable for any excess
of force used beyond what is needful to effect the
result.(2)
Where the ticket agent of a rail road company
having been warned by the police to look out for coun-
terfeit five dollar bills, sold tickets to two strangers
who paid a new $5.00 bill and received their changeand
tickets and he then caused their arrest, he was held not
to be acting within his employment, in a suit for
damages for false imprisonment, the bill having been
proven genuine ; because the duty of the agent to the
defendant was to have refused to take the bill if he
suspected it to be counterfeit and ,wihen he accepted it
his only purpose could have been to further the efforts
(1) Higgens v vatervliet Co., 46 1.Y. 20 (1871).(2
Peck v 11. Y. C. & H. R. R. 70 N. Y. b87 (1877).
of the police and could not be considered as something
which his employers or his employment required him to
do. (1)
In Chapman v the N. Y. C. R. R. Co. (2) the defen-
dant's servant after working hours went through a gate
from the plaintiffs field to the defendants tracks and
left the bars open whereby the plaintiff's horses got
on the track and were killed, The servant was a day
laborer receiving his pay monthly but at a fixed rate
per day. On the night when he took the bars down he
was on his own business. He testified that qfter his
days work was done it was his duty "if I seen anything
amiss after that I had to do it". The defendant was
held liable for it was the servants duty to shut the bars
if he saw them down no matter who left them open.
(1) Mi4ligen v N.Y.& R.B.R.Co., 129 N.Y. 500 (1892).
(2) Chapman v N.Y.C..R.Co., 36 N.Y.369 (1865).
The Greater Liability of Common Carriers.
In regard to common carriers there grows out of
the contractual relation between the parties a liability
to the passenger for the servants acts greater and mo'e
extended than between the ordinary master and the third
person* The rule seems to be that a common carrie i
is bound so far as practicable, co protect his passengers
while being conveyed, from violence committed by stranger
and co-passengers and he undertakes absolutely to protect
them against the misconduct of its servants while engaged
in executing the contract. (1)
The courts of several other states (2) had enunciet-
ed this doctrine when it was first definitely adopted by
the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Stewart v
Brooklyn and Crosstown Railroad.(l) In that case a
(1) Stewart v Brooklyn & Crosstown R, R., 00 N.Y.
588 (1882); Dwinelle v N.Y.C.& H.R.Co. 120
N.Y. 121 (1890-; Palmeri v Manhatten Co. 130
N.Y. 261 (1892).
(2) Goddard v Grand Trunk Railway 57 Me. 202 (18d9)
Day v Owen 5 Mich. 520 (1858); Commonwealth
v Power 7 Metc. 596 (1846); Bryant v Bush
106 Jiass. (1871); P.F.W.& C.Ry. Co. v Hinds,
passenger' in a street car vias assaulted and severely
beaten by the driver of the car. The trIal court dis-
missed the plaintiffs complaint on the ground that the
defendants servant, in assaulting the plaintiff was not
acting within the scope of his employment, but attacked
the plaintiff to gratify some wicked and malicious
purpose of his own. The Court of Appeals overruled this
decision and held the defendants liable. Judge Tracy
in his opinion said "Had the person assaulted been one
to whom the defendant owed no duty, the dismissa1 of the
plaintiffs complaint would probably have been correct;
but the rule which applies in such a case has no appli-
cation as between a common carrier and his passenger.
By the defendants contract withnthe plaintiff, it had
undertaken to carry him safely and to treat him respect-
fully; and while a comron carrier does not undertake to
53 Penn. St. 512, (1866); Flint v N.7 N.Y. T.
Co. 34 Conn. 554 (1867); Croker v C.& N.Y.
Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 504 (1874); Chicago * E.
R.R.Co. v Flexman, 103 Ill. 540 (1882).
insure against injury fromf every possible danger, he
does undertake to protect the passenger against any
injury arising from the negligence or wilful misconduct
of . s servants while engaged in performing a duty which
the carrier owes to the passenger.
In a recent ease the plaintiff purchased a ticket
of the defendants agent at one of its stations and after
some altercation about the change, passed through the
gate to take a train. The agent followed her out upon
the platform, charged her with having passed upon him a
counterfeit twenty-five cent piece and demanded another
in its place. She refused insisting that her money
was genuine and refused to give back the change received*
The agent called her a counterfeiter and other vile
names, placed his hands upon her and told her not to stir
until he had procured a policeman to arrest and search
her. He detained her on the platform for a while but
not getting an officer, let her go. The court held
that she could recover and that once the relation of
carriep and passengec was entelred upon, the carrier was
answerable for all consequenceses to the passenger from
the wilful misconduct or negligence of the persons em-
ployed by it in the execution of the contract which it
has undertaken towards the passenger. (I)
A New York Superior Court decision seems to carry
this doctrine still farther and to make the railroad
liable as to a passenge.- to one who is lawfully on their
stations in the course of his businesstfov the company
was held liable to a person who having applied for a
ticket and having been refused was assaulted as he
was leaving the station. (2)
(1) Palmeri v Manhattan Ry. Co. supra.
(2) McKernan v Manhattan Ry. Co., 22 J & S 3b4,
(1887).
